In 2001, RadioShack bought the former Ripley Arnold public housing complex in Downtown Fort Worth for US$20 million.
The acquisition did not include rights to RadioShack's intellectual property (such as its trademarks), rights to RadioShack's franchised locations, and customer records, which were to be sold separately. Although they would be treated as a co-tenant, the Sprint branding would be more prominent in promotion and exterior signage than that of RadioShack.
Sprint stated that this arrangement would increase the company's retail footprint by more than double the company previously had around 1,100 company-owned retail outlets, in comparison to the over 2,000 run by AT&T Mobility. The stores would collect commissions on the sale of Sprint products, and Sprint would assist in promotion. As part of the deal, the company entered into a partnership with Sprint, in which the company would become a co-tenant at 1,435 RadioShack locations and establish store within a store areas devoted to selling its wireless brands, including Sprint, Boost Mobile and Virgin Mobile. On March 31, 2015, the bankruptcy court approved a US$160 million offer by the Standard General affiliate General Wireless, gaining ownership of 1,743 RadioShack locations. This move drew immediate widespread public criticism for its lack of sensitivity. Instead of issuing severance payments immediately, the company withheld them to ensure that company-issued BlackBerrys, laptops and cellphones were returned. Unfortunately your position is one that has been eliminated.' Four hundred and three workers were given 30 minutes to collect their personal effects, say their goodbyes to co-workers and then attend a meeting with their senior supervisors. On Tuesday, August 29, the affected workers received an e-mail: 'The work force reduction notification is currently in progress. On August 10, 2006, RadioShack announced plans to eliminate a fifth of its company headquarters workforce to reduce overhead expense, improving its long-term competitive position while supporting a significantly smaller number of stores. ĭespite these actions, stock prices plummeted within what was otherwise a booming market. In markets too small to support a company-owned Radio Shack store, the chain relied on independent dealers who carried the products as a sideline. As an incentive for them to work long hours and remain profitable, store managers were required to take an ownership stake in their stores. Customer data from the former RadioShack mail-order business determined where Tandy would locate new stores.
Private-label brands from lower-cost manufacturers displaced name brands to raise Radio Shack profit margins non-electronic lines from go-carts to musical instruments were abandoned entirely. The number of items carried was cut from 40,000 to 2,500, as Tandy sought to 'identify the 20% that represents 80% of the sales' and replace Radio Shack's handful of large stores with many 'little holes in the wall', large numbers of rented locations which were easier to close and re-open elsewhere if one location didn't work out. Tandy closed Radio Shack's unprofitable mail-order business, ended credit purchases and eliminated many top management positions, keeping the salespeople, merchandisers and advertisers. It created small stores that were staffed by people who knew electronics, and sold mainly private brands. Tandy's strategy was to appeal to hobbyists.
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